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Woodman / Law
LAW, TRANSLATION, AND VOICE
Transformation of a Struggle
for Social Justice in a Chinese Village
Sophia Woodman
ABSTRACT: The channeling of popular struggles through legal cases is central to the
strategy of the emerging “rights defense” movement in China, linking grassroots
contention with professional mediators who translate grievances into the institu-
tional environment of law. This was the case in an unusual, ultimately unsuccessful
campaign in 2005 to remove an elected village chief in Taishi Village in Guangdong,
China, by legal means. While the grievances that sparked the campaign were about
the unequal distribution of the benefits from village development, the strategy of in-
stituting a recall procedure and the framing of the campaign in terms of democracy
and rule of law obscured distinctly gendered issues of poverty and inequality in the
village, even though women were among the most visible protesters. This article
employs a “sociology of translation” to link framing processes and power dynamics,
thus proposing a methodological approach to reconnecting framing with other as-
pects of movements. In the Taishi case, the translation of the dispute into the
language of law had contrary effects: it opened the door to a legitimate, if temporary,
public space for the airing of villagers’ claims. At the same time, translation legiti-
mized the voices of “experts” who then became de facto leaders in this public space;
it also increasingly shifted the action to the internet, to which the villagers appar-
ently had no access. This analysis raises questions about whether such strategies
may result in either the formation of durable rights-based identities among grass-
roots participants or a sense of being connected to a broader social movement.
In the summer of 2005, a long-simmering dispute in the Pearl River Delta’s
Taishi Village over the distribution of benefits from “development” erupted into
street protests after several villagers, acting on advice from outside activists, ini-
tiated a legal procedure to remove the elected village chief, Chen Jinsheng, on
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the grounds that he and his cronies had pocketed funds that should have gone
to the collective welfare. While the recall was ultimately unsuccessful and the
protests ended in brutal repression, at certain points the campaign achieved
significant victories and resulted in extensive mobilization among villagers, par-
ticularly middle-aged and elderly women.
Although the protests in Taishi Village were rooted in efforts to achieve social
justice for impoverished villagers, outside the village, the framing of the conten-
tion was quickly transformed into a campaign for democratic rights. As such,
Chinese legal scholars and activists in the “rights defense” movement heralded
the campaign as a breakthrough, a major step toward political reform from the
grassroots up. The villagers’ legal adviser, Guo Feixiong, later wrote: “Our ob-
jective is very clear: we will promote ‘political reform under the rule of law’ as
exemplified in the ‘Taishi model,’ thus realizing constitutional democracy grad-
ually and in an orderly manner.”1
This vision was not the starting point of the campaign. Its genesis may be
seen in what became its iconic image: a woman in her eighties standing on a pile
of rubble with a loudhailer. This photo accompanied a news item on the Taishi
villagers’ first public meeting.2 During its short duration—July to September
2005—the campaign attracted extensive media attention inside and outside
China, and the picture was widely circulated on the internet. So, what did the
woman, Feng Zhen, say? The journalist did not record her exact words, but re-
ported that she spoke in an “accusatory tone” of how the Villager Committee
headed by Chief Chen had been unfair in distributing the wealth generated
from the village’s collective assets. As a consequence, she said, some villagers
such as her were now very poor, and she could not afford medical treatment.
The elision of her actual words was not incidental; it was the first indication
of a pattern in the evolution of the contention in which the grievances of some
of the most intrepid protesters, predominantly women, were displaced by the
reframing of the dispute. These grievances were about social justice,3 not de-
mocracy or the rule of law: they centered on the fact that while as much as a
third of the village’s arable land had been taken over by industrial and commer-
cial enterprises, a number of its residents were living in dire poverty. The
villagers charged Chief Chen with corruption, nepotism, maladministration,
and neglect of the village poor. Acting on the advice of Guo Feixiong and other
outsiders, they initiated the recall procedure.
So what was the relationship between the two divergent central frames of
this dispute, democratic rights and local poverty amid rapid “development”? By
exploring the processes of translation from one to the other, this article consid-
ers the potential of the legal strategies adopted by China’s growing “rights
defense movement” to generate popular mobilization and consciousness of
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1. Guo 2005 (Wo), unpaginated.
2. Feng Shanshu 2005.
3. This is not the term used by the villagers. As noted by Wong, the phrase “social justice” is not
commonly used in mainland China (2004, 152). I am using it here to summarize the types of
grievances raised in the Taishi protests.
rights. The loose-knit network of activists across China that constitutes the
movement seeks to link grassroots contention and elite politics,4 and legal cases
have become the core strategy of a growing number of rights defense lawyers,
who are “consciously us[ing] lawsuits as social mobilization for legal and politi-
cal reform.”5 From the point of view of rights defense activists, then, the Taishi
campaign was an attempt to link local contention to a national movement by
connecting grassroots protests to elite allies. Two activists from outside the vil-
lage were involved in the planning and execution of the campaign, while many
others helped to raise the profile of the dispute. There was intense discussion
about the case among people in the rights defense movement, mediated
through the internet and extending into transnational media, as well as among
a wider network of supporters, among them prominent public intellectuals.
The linkages made in these rights defense cases address a gap identified by
both scholars and activists. Despite a phenomenal rise in contentious collective
action across China from the 1990s onwards,6 grassroots protests have largely
failed to find elite allies.7 Elizabeth Perry has claimed that a principal explana-
tion for the failure of the 1989 protests to pose a real challenge to the
dominance of the ruling Communist Party was the insistence of the students on
keeping emerging workers’ organizations at arms length.8 Writing on more re-
cent worker protests, Ching Kwan Lee argues that among the reasons the rapid
rise in public expression of discontent has resulted in only piecemeal conces-
sions rather than more systemic change are a lack of connection between elites
and protesters on the ground and the absence of cross-class linkages.9 Yet some
maintain that these conditions are beginning to change. Writing in 2006 on the
rising tide of rural protests, Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang assert that these
could well evolve into “a more far-reaching counterhegemonic project” and
that the situation is ripe for exploitation by “social movement entrepreneurs.”10
Jae Ho Chung, Hongyi Lai, and Ming Xia point to “[c]ity-based democracy move-
ments” as a potential bridge between different types of protests.11 According to
Jean-Philippe Béja, the rights defense movement is already bridging the class di-
vides that hampered previous movements.12
As one of the first major “cases” taken up by the rights defense movement,
Taishi is a “critical case”13 through which to examine the effects of such linkages
on identity and mobilization. In this article, I focus on the public spaces for de-
bate created around the Taishi contention and on what kinds of framings of the
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4. The protagonists of this self-styled “movement”—which includes lawyers, academics, journal-
ists and semi-professional activists—generally date its emergence to 2003, when the death of a
young migrant in police custody provoked a nationwide campaign on the internet. See for ex-
ample Fu and Cullen 2008.
5. Feng 2009, 161; see also Fu and Cullen 2008; Mosher and Poon 2009.
6. Chung, Lai, and Xia 2006; Tanner 2004.
7. Lee and Friedman 2009; O’Brien 2009; Lee 2007.
8. Perry 2002.
9. Lee 2007.
10. O’Brien and Li 2006, 126-27.
11. Chung, Lai and Xia 2006, 30.
12. Béja 2009.
13. Snow and Trom 2002, 158–59.
dispute were used in them. I highlight the roles of several actors in the transfor-
mation of the central frames of the Taishi dispute, employing a “sociology of
translation” to explore these processes, including how certain “collective action
frames” were chosen and the power effects of these choices. This methodologi-
cal approach highlights changes in the action and the position of actors over
time, showing how choices of language and strategy shape emerging hierar-
chies among actors, serve to alter patterns of power, and privilege certain types
of action. It has particular relevance, then, for contentious politics around law
and rights. The material conditions of the action and the inseparability of hu-
man and nonhuman “actants” are also highlighted in my account; for example,
the effects of access to different technologies.14 The law itself is one such tech-
nology. My approach envisages a number of doors or “passage points”15 that
open to different “public spheres,” focusing on how these political spaces are
constituted and who can speak in them. It thus highlights the middle people:
translators or mediators who move and translate between such spaces.16 Such
people have a variety of different roles, identities, and loyalties, some of which
may be crucial in shaping movement outcomes.
My analysis of the Taishi case shows that the translation of grassroots griev-
ances into legal cases as a strategy for building a counter-hegemonic movement
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14. Callon 1986; Latour 2005.
15. Callon 1986.
16. Chatterjee 2004; Merry 2006 (Transnational) and 2006 (Human); Stern 2005.
Issues of gendered poverty brought many women to the forefront of the protests in Taishi.
Here an elderly villager comes to have her signature on the recall motion verified by a
township official, on 7 September 2005. (Credit: Huang Haitao)
in China may have contrary effects. On the one hand, by providing a procedural
avenue for villagers’ claims, translation into the language of the law opened the
door to institutional arenas for claims-making. It thus created a legitimate, if
temporary, public space for the airing of villagers’ grievances beyond the village.
At the same time, however, it deprived many of the original claimants of voice in
that public space: translation shifted the focus of the contention in such a way
that women like Feng Zhen could no longer speak the public language in which
the campaign was conducted. Translation legitimized the voices of “experts”
who then became de facto spokespersons—even leaders—for the collective ac-
tion; it also shifted the public space in which the action was conducted to a
virtual one—the internet—to which the villagers had no access.17 For these rea-
sons, I argue, the potential for the formation of durable rights-based identities
among participants in the collective action—and also of a collective identity for
a sustained movement that might endure despite official repression—was
greatly diminished. Even in the face of state hostility, the emergence of such
identities could be facilitated through alternative spaces in which people have
the opportunity to transform their own needs talk into rights talk,18 but appar-
ently this did not occur in Taishi.
Translation and Collective Action
The analysis of the “collective action frames” through which social movements
communicate has become a major subfield in the sociological literature on so-
cial movements.19 While advocates of this approach see framing as “an active,
processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention,”20 all too often
the processual dimension is lost in a focus on identifying types and forms.21 In
analyzing the effects of choices of subject matter and strategy in the Taishi con-
tention, I adopt translation as a concept metaphor that highlights process.
Framing implies that existing elements are selected, isolated, and highlighted,
while translation implies transformation and mediation on two levels: language
and action. In Bruno Latour’s conceptualization, translation is “a connection
that transports…transformation.” Mediators, human and nonhuman, are not
mere conduits or “intermediaries,” they “transform, translate, distort and mod-
ify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.”22 This concept of
translation concentrates on the transformations that occur as linkages are cre-
ated between the human actors, their textual formulations, and the material
conditions of the action. It thus provides a means to link framing with other as-
pects of movements.
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17. Aside from the texts cited here (which were all put online by others), I did not find any postings
by Taishi villagers, and there are none in the compilation of internet postings (Fan 2005).
18. Baiocchi 2005; Johnston 2000.
19. Its application to contention in China is fairly recent. See, for example, various chapters in
O’Brien 2008; Thornton 2002 (Framing); and Thornton 2002 (Insinuation).
20. Benford and Snow 2000, 614.
21. Benford 1997.
22. Latour 2005, 108, 39.
The choice of collective action frames and the way they are woven together
into “a cultural matrix” from available political and cultural resources depends
on particular actors and their situations.23 But these actors often speak very dif-
ferent languages, literally and figuratively, and thus framing choices can validate
some ways of speaking and invalidate others. In addition, the process of transla-
tion opens up certain spaces to certain speakers, while closing the door on
other voices and other versions. Adopting a certain “problematization” defines
the actors and their potential roles, setting in motion a chain of engagements
that shape the form of the collective action.24 Analyzing collective action from
the perspective of translation foregrounds the power effects of framing choices.
It attempts to trace how these power effects come about, rather than attributing
them to a preexisting structure of domination.25
I combine translation in this sense with a different version focused on per-
sons that has been widely used in fields including socio-legal studies and
anthropology. This version highlights the people who mediate between the
grassroots and higher levels and emphasizes that their positioning affects the
outcomes of their intervention. For example, Sally Engle Merry and Rachel
Stern show that the relative commitment of “translators” to transnational forces
and to local communities shapes the adaptation of human rights to local condi-
tions and traditions.26 While their focus is “translators” in the transnational
spread of human rights as discourse and practice, their perspective is also useful
in illuminating primarily intra-state processes, as I use it here. In particular, it
helps to reveal specific features of contentious politics in the terrain of law,
since as an “institutional environment” law makes mediators and translators
crucial to the activation of a politics of rights.27
As Merry points out, sustaining such a politics and fully incorporating rights
into local practice depend on transforming the identities of participants into
rights-bearing subjects in a durable way. She argues that this transformation is
contingent on whether or not an individual or group’s use of rights-oriented ap-
proaches is successful and whether or not such an identity receives institutional
support.28 The latter element could take non-state forms, particularly the forma-
tion of “subaltern counter-publics” in which needs talk can be translated into
rights talk.29 But the individualizing nature of rights may make the formation of
collective identities around them particularly problematic,30 raising a further set
of questions about links between rights consciousness and mobilization. As Mi-
chael McCann indicates, even when activists mount successful legal actions, this
has not necessarily led to mobilization around rights, and rights-oriented mobi-
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23. Tarrow 1994, 134.
24. Callon 1986, 203–11.
25. Latour 2005, 83.
26. Merry 2006 (Transnational), 39-40; Stern 2005.
27. Wilson 2007, 342.
28. Merry 2006 (Human).
29. Johnston 2000.
30. As Melucci cautions, the collective “we” of a social movement is never a given (1995).
lization can occur in the absence of obvious legal victories.31 Eli Friedman’s
study of the relationship between worker movements and transnational cam-
paigning in South China highlights an analogous tension between external
pressure and local mobilization.32
Law has become a key arena for contentious politics in China, and the estab-
lishment of legal institutions and the codification of legal norms have
proceeded at a rapid pace. One aspect of the state project of “legal construc-
tion” has been to channel grievances into legal arenas. Seeking out relatively
“safe” space for protest actions in an authoritarian political climate has been an
important feature shaping movement activity,33 and in the last two decades, law
became one of the most important of such spaces, as activists began to use the
central government’s commitment to “ruling the country in accordance with
law” to push forward local claims-making.34 In rural China, this has been a key
strategy in what O’Brien and Li call “rightful resistance,” which presses claims
against local officials and governments on the basis of central law and policy.35
But as a number of authors have pointed out, law is used in a variety of different
ways, depending on factors such as the venue where the claim is made and the
identity of the claimants.36
Yet questions regarding how and when individuals and groups adopt rights-
based identities and the relationship between these processes and mobilization
have been insufficiently problematized. One reason is that the transnational
Chinese-language media and opposition groups translate all kinds of griev-
ances and protests occurring in China into rights frames, often obscuring the
specific terms the participants use. Goldman is typical in interpreting rising
contention to a spread of rights consciousness to “the population at large.”37
The insights of socio-legal studies into the contrary effects of a focus on law as a
strategy for social movements38 have not been sufficiently considered outside a
small but growing literature on contention around law in China.
What evidence there is suggests that the effects of engagement with the law
on both rights-based identities and mobilization may be mixed and certainly
cannot be captured in the simple linear progression posited by many accounts.
Mary Gallagher’s study of Chinese workers who sought to resolve grievances
through legal means—one of the few studies that has systematically considered
the development of legal consciousness in China—found that they developed
“a better sense of [their] rights but with reduced belief in the law as a capable
protector of those rights.”39 Barriers to bringing legal action are high. Michel-
son’s research has found that most lawyers in China do not welcome poor and
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33. Zhao 2000.
34. Diamant et al. 2005; Lee 2007; Feng 2009.
35. O’Brien and Li 2006.
36. Lee 2007; Thireau and Hua 2005.
37. Goldman 2005, 223.
38. McCann 2006.
39. Gallagher 2006, 810.
disadvantaged clients, and have little interest in taking up cases that could
threaten their relationships with local power-holders on which successful legal
practice depends.40 Neil Diamant et al. note that research has been insufficient
on “how aggrieved parties work to generate solidarity and a critical mass of sup-
porters.”41
The rights defense movement is an important site for examining these issues.
The movement’s supporters claim that it is “transforming the people’s con-
sciousness from that of obedient subjects to autonomous citizens…and
encouraging citizens to further organize themselves for civil rights purposes.”42
The Taishi affair is used here as a case study of such processes, part of the effort
to overcome a disconnection that some scholars have argued has sometimes
been fatal to social movements in China.43
Sources and Central Actors
The source material for this article consists of fifteen Chinese-language texts
written and circulated in 2005 and 2006, mainly through the internet.44 This tex-
tual focus has obvious limitations, but does provide sufficient materials to
analyze the sequence of events and the approaches of some major actors. My
principal sources are texts associated with four sets of actors: “the village
women,” “the village recall campaigners,” “the cause lawyer,” and “the virtual
rights defense movement,” as well as various pronouncements from the local
government.45 Where possible, I use the texts these actors produced, rather
than press reports, although in the case of the village women, all were mediated
through the reporting of others. The discourses of the actors may be arrayed
along a spectrum that reflects their degree of engagement with the universaliz-
ing language of law. Both the village recall campaigners and the cause lawyer are
the middle elements, and the languages spoken by the village women and the
virtual rights defense movement have little overlap, with the village women
hardly using the language of law at all.
The texts produced by the village recall campaigners were a collective en-
deavor, but Feng Qiusheng, the only Taishi villager about whom much more
than a name, age, and occupation are known, is the specified author. One of the
initiators of the recall campaign and in his mid twenties at the time of the pro-
tests, he is an accountant and university graduate whose family has lived in
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40. Michelson 2006.
41. Diamant et al. 2005, 11.
42. Feng 2009, 163.
43. Perry 2001 and 2002; Lee 2007.
44. The intense interest among “rights defense movement” activists in this case meant that efforts
were made to preserve the related texts, even after the ban on circulating information on the
protests. I use the comprehensive compilation of documents, “Memorandum on the Taishi Vil-
lage Incident,” compiled by Fan Yafeng, a legal scholar who wrote commentaries on Taishi (Fan
2005). I supplemented this by checking chronologies and accounts prepared by others, in-
cluding the Wikipedia entry which contains links to important texts (2005). I conducted
individual searches to find key texts mentioned in a number of documents but missing from
the Memorandum. In the China context, Wikipedia is a repository of information the state will
not allow and thus a key resource for materials on protests and collective actions.
45. All translations in this article are my own.
Taishi for generations. He spent four months in detention following the crack-
down on the protests, and in March 2006 ran unsuccessfully for election to the
local people’s congress. I use three texts that Feng coauthored: “Open Letter to
Taishi Village Elders and Fellow Villagers,”46 “Text of Speech of Taishi Villager
Feng Qiusheng at the Law Popularization Meeting,”47 and “Taishi Villagers Hun-
ger Strike Declaration”48 (hereafter without quotation marks). After Feng’s
detention on 30 August no further texts appeared.
The village women did not produce any texts themselves, thus their voices
are mediated through the reportage of others, particularly Ai Xiaoming, a pro-
fessor of comparative literature at Zhongshan University and an activist on
gender issues. Ai became involved in publicizing the unfolding events in Taishi,
particularly the police violence and detentions and their effects on villagers. She
eventually made a video documentary about Taishi and wrote a widely circu-
lated account originally published in “Freezing Point,” a supplement to the
newspaper China Youth Daily.49 Lü Banglie, an activist and adviser to villagers
from Hubei Province, also highlights the role of women in the protests in his
documentary accounts.50 Over the last five years, Lü, a farmer turned politician,
went from petitioning the authorities about local grievances to being elected to
his local people’s congress. He initiated a successful recall campaign in his
home village and was elected chief of the Villager Committee, receiving 80 per-
cent of the villagers’ votes.51
The cause lawyer52 associated with the rights defense movement is Guo
Feixiong (real name Yang Maodong), a professional activist from Guangzhou,
who had been involved in the 1989 demonstrations as a student. A writer and
self-trained “barefoot lawyer,” at the time of the Taishi events Guo was em-
ployed by the Shengzhi Law Firm in Beijing as a legal adviser. While Guo was a
principal liaison with the media and the internet community for the Taishi con-
tention until his detention on 13 September, he wrote very little commentary
on it until after the events. While I refer to five of Guo’s texts, I focus largely on
two: “I am out of jail” and the text of a speech he gave on the Taishi events at Har-
vard University in June 2006.53 In November 2007, Guo was sentenced to a
five-year prison term for “illegal business”; Guo, his defense lawyer, human
rights organizations, and transnational media have all interpreted his convic-
tion as retaliation for his activism.
The perspective of the virtual rights defense movement is considered
through the list of internet postings and news articles from the Chinese domes-
tic media related to the Taishi events, as collected in the 383-page
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47. Feng Qiusheng 2005. “Speech” hereafter.
48. Feng and Liang 2005. “Declaration” hereafter.
49. Ai 2005 (Taishi); Ai 2005 (Wo linjin).
50. Lü 2005 (Jueshi), 2005 (9 yue).
51. Chai 2004.
52. I am indebted to Fu Hualing for this characterization of Guo.
53. Guo 2005 (Wo); Guo 2006.
“Memorandum” compiled by Fan Yafeng.54 Since the main focus of my study is
the Taishi contention and the public spaces created around it, rather than the
engagement of domestic and transnational activists with it through the medium
of the internet, I read the titles of these articles and the full text of a small selec-
tion of those that seemed most relevant to my concerns.
Village Recall Campaigners
In July 2005, a group of Taishi villagers launched a campaign to recall their
elected Villager Committee head, Chen Jinsheng.55 Chen had been a leader of
the village for many years, previously serving as secretary of the local Commu-
nist Party branch, holding this post concurrently with the chairmanship of the
Villager Committee at the time of the recall campaign.
Taishi Village, part of Yuwotou Township in Guangzhou’s Panyu District, has
a population of just over 2,000, a substantial proportion of whom are poor.56 Sit-
uated in a suburban district of a major Chinese city, following its designation as
a “development zone,” much of its land had been leased out or expropriated
over the years for factories, so that very little land was left to farm. A village
shareholding cooperative functions as a structure for several enterprises, and
villagers hold shares that yield an annual dividend.57 The accounts presented by
village leaders indicated that the village was actually in debt, there were thus no
funds to put into collective welfare.
Some villagers alleged that nepotism and corruption meant most of them
had not received their rightful share of the wealth created by the village land and
businesses, and members of the Villager Committee58 were responsible, they
said. In the course of their unsuccessful efforts over a number of years at resolv-
ing these complaints through petitioning higher authorities to intervene,
several Taishi villagers, notably Feng Qiusheng, were introduced to Guo Fei-
xiong and Lü Banglie. Lü suggested recall as a strategy. This became the first
passage point, changing the situation in Taishi from a simmering local dispute
to a national cause célèbre. The first step involved collecting the 300+ signa-
tures required under the “Organic Law on Villagers Committees” for a recall
motion.59 On 29 July, a group of villagers submitted copies of their recall motion
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54. Fan 2005.
55. Unless otherwise stated, the account of events is based on the Wikipedia chronology (2005). A
detailed account of the whole campaign in English is available: “In Chinese Uprisings, Peasants
Find New Allies: Protesters Gain Help of Veteran Activists,” Washington Post, 26 November
2005, A1.
56. Ai 2005 (Wo linjin).
57. At the time of the dispute the dividends were only about 1,000 yuan per person per year (from
which local taxes and fees would be deducted) (ibid.). This amounted to between US$74 and
$86. In August 2005, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to 8.10 yuan.
58. Villager committees were written into the 1982 Chinese Constitution as elected “mass organi-
zations of self-management at the grassroots level” (Art. 111). They are not technically
organizations of government, but a kind of executive of village self-governance. But villager
committee members are agents of the state: they transmit government policies to villagers and
ensure their compliance with those policies.
59. Art. 16 of the 1998 PRC Organic Law on Villager Committees stipulates: “A joint petition signed
by 20 percent or more of the electors in the village may demand recall of a member of the vil-
to the Panyu District Civil Affairs Bureau,60 the Yuwotou Township government
and the Taishi Villagers Committee, affixed with more than 400 signatures or fin-
gerprints. The following day, the recall organizers distributed in the village their
“Open Letter” detailing malfeasance by Chen Jinsheng and the other members
of the Committee.61
Addressed to “respected elders and village kin,” the Open Letter implicitly
contrasts the behavior of Chen and his nepotistic fellows with a lost collective
ethos and presents a list of twenty-seven charges. Ten of the charges involve the
transfer of land-use rights in which Villager Committee members or their fami-
lies allegedly gained illegitimate benefit or which had not been adequately
explained to villagers. For example, in charge No. 1, the Letter states that villag-
ers were told that 14,960 square meters of land had been leased to the “Profit
Jewelry Company” for 2.7 million yuan, but in fact the firm is leasing 29,277
square meters at a cost of 6.4 million yuan. Where is the additional three million
yuan? the Letter asks. Among the more general land-related charges is No. 17,
which states that the Villager Assembly62 was never convened to discuss land
use, instead “a few village cadres made all the decisions.” Another ten of the
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lager committee. A recall demand must provide the reasons for the recall. Any member of a
villager committee whose recall is demanded has the right to put forward opinions in his/her
defense. The villager committee must, in a timely fashion, organize a meeting of the villagers’
assembly to vote on the recall demand. A motion to recall a villager committee member must
be passed by a majority of the village’s electors.” Of the Taishi population, 1502 were counted
as electors, so a recall motion required at least 301 signatures.
60. While the law gives villagers the right of recall, in cases when they wish to recall the villager
committee chief or the whole committee, they are supposed to act under the “guidance” of lo-
cal government. Since the villager committee convenes the meeting of the villager assembly to
debate the recall, some outside intervention is inevitable.
61. Some Taishi Villagers 2005.
62. This is supposed to be composed of all adult villagers or their representatives.
Older women (some of them pictured here) played a prominent role in maintaining the
month-long 24-hour guard on the Villager Committee office to prevent the removal of
“evidence” of wrongdoing by Chen and his cronies. (Credit: Huang Haitao)
charges cover misdeeds ranging from lack of financial transparency to outright
corruption. A further seven charges fall into the category of administrative negli-
gence, including approving dangerous buildings, failing to curb pollution from
local factories, an unresponsive security team, and lack of attention to the vil-
lage poor. In the latter category, according to charge No. 21, Villager Committee
members “never went to bring cheer to the neediest households on New Year’s
Day or other festivals.” 63 This is one of several charges that indict Chen and his
fellow Villager Committee members for failing to maintain the collective life of
the village by caring for its poor, its infrastructure, and its environment.64
On 31 July, the recall group organized an open-air “law popularization meet-
ing” in the village, which was attended by a number of outsiders, including
journalists. (Another such meeting was held on 14 August.) Staged just outside
the Villager Committee office, the meeting was evidently intended as a show of
force. In bringing the dispute into the public eye—particularly through media
reporting of the event—this became another critical passage point. Feng
Qiusheng presented the legal basis for the recall campaign. Addressing the con-
cerns of “many people who were doubtful about whether the action could
succeed,” he said the objective of the meeting was “to build people’s trust.”65 Af-
ter Feng completed his speech, he invited others to contribute. A number of
women came forward, and then the elderly Feng Zhen stood up on a pile of rub-
ble and spoke to the crowd. As mentioned above, this image appeared with the
first report on the recall effort in the official media.
Statements issued by the villagers supporting the recall during the first
month of the campaign present their demands in terms of correct and full im-
plementation of the law. The Open Letter and the Speech frame the recall
campaign as aimed at implementing central government norms that local au-
thorities have ignored and are thus squarely in the tradition of “rightful
resistance” described by O’Brien and Li.66 The Speech presents a vision of law as
“our protective deity” and “a weapon” to be used against “corrupt and rotten el-
ements.” These village cadres who “don’t want to give the power back to the
people” must be “pushed out of office.” The characterization of public gather-
ings on 31 July and 14 August as “law popularization” (pufa) meetings claims
legitimacy for the creation of a public space for discussion in Taishi by linking it
to the long-term state project of legal education of the population.
The claims of the village recall campaigners combine an emphasis on justice
defined as fairness and attention to the collective good with their appeal to law,
thus giving the legal texts they cite a reach beyond their firmly established mean-
ing. This can be seen as an effort to translate law into a local “vernacular,”67
bridging the gap between state laws and the grievances of the villagers. It also re-
196 Critical Asian Studies 43:2 (2011)
63. “Bringing cheer to the neediest households” (gei tekunhu song wennuan) is a communist rit-
ual that involves top state leaders visiting poor families (with media in tow), especially around
Chinese New Year, to bring gifts, thus showing their concern about poverty and inequality.
64. Some Taishi Villagers 2005.
65. Feng Qiusheng 2005.
66. O’Brien and Li 2006, 5-9.
67. Merry 2006 (Transnational), 39.
flects how law may be used differently depending on the venue.68 The Open
Letter and the Speech thus evince an expansive vision of the rights of villagers to
self-governance, including “the right to make decisions on policy on matters
large and small,” “the right to know” about all the financial affairs of the village,
and “the right to assess” the salaries of village officials.
The Speech does not focus on the provisions on recall, but concentrates in-
stead on the distribution of power in the village. It presents the relationship
between the villager assembly and the villager committee in the PRC Organic
Law on Villager Committees as one in which the committee should get approval
from the assembly on “matters relating to the interests of villagers,” arguing that
failing to do so is “a serious infringement of rights and violation of law.” It asserts
that the Law gives the assembly “the right to make decisions” and the committee
should merely implement them.69 “In other words, we villagers are the deci-
sion-makers, the masters; while the village cadres are just the implementers, the
servants.” As a manifestation of this master/servant relationship, the Speech
points out, the Villager Committee is supposed to make public the village ac-
counts at least every six months.
The texts produced by the village recall campaigners constitute the village as
a public space in which collective interests are determined through deliberative
mechanisms, as a means of achieving a just moral order. This vision is con-
trasted with the nepotistic practices of Chen Jinsheng and his fellow Villager
Committee members, who refuse to make public village affairs and conduct vil-
lage business in a way that benefits their families and cronies, rather than the
collective.
Local Authorities Push Back
Local officials sought to assert their own version of the law to situate the pro-
tests and their organizers outside the scope of the permissible. Here, as so
commonly seen in the rightful resistance studied by O’Brien and Li, the central
authorities are the silent partner to which both sides claim to be allied.70
Following the 31 July public meeting, tensions rose and police and unidenti-
fied men began to be seen around the village. Village officials were spotted
going into the Villager Committee office at night, and villagers suspected that
they were attempting to doctor the accounts. From 3 August on, villagers sup-
porting the recall maintained a 24–hour watch outside the Villager Committee
office. For the next week or so, police and officials from outside the village came
periodically to try to get into the office, but were refused entry. Local authorities
issued warnings that the blockade of the office was “illegal.” But from the pro-
testing villagers’ point of view they were protecting evidence that would prove
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the villagers’ case as well as assert their legitimate collective rights over village
property.
Tensions came to a head on 16 August, when a number of villagers were in-
jured in clashes with police and officials who were trying to detain village
activists, seven of whom were arrested and held for 15-day administrative
detentions.
On 29 August, the Panyu Civil Affairs Bureau declared the villagers’ recall mo-
tion invalid on the grounds that only a copy of the original had been submitted.
On 31 August at 6:30 A.M., eighty Taishi villagers staged a protest outside the
Panyu District government headquarters carrying a banner that read: “Hunger
strike to protest the illegal actions of the Panyu District Civil Affairs Bureau in
breaching the PRC Organic Law on Villagers Committees.” The day before, they
had prepared the “Taishi Villagers Hunger Strike Declaration,” which Guo
Feixiong posted on the internet on 31 August. This text was also given out to
passersby at the protest site.71 At 9:30 A.M., police arrested three key organizers
of the protest, Feng Qiusheng, Liang Shusheng, and Feng Huibiao. At 11:00 A.M.
police took away the protesters’ banner. But the protest continued, and in the
course of the following two days, as protesters were arrested, new groups came
to replace them, and were themselves detained.
The Hunger Strike Declaration provides an account of what had happened
up to that time and presents a defense of villagers’ actions, in particular the
blockade of the Villager Committee office. The basic argument is that the villag-
ers’ actions are protecting the law, while the officials who are trying to thwart
them are breaking it. While the previous two documents focused on the village
cadres, here higher-level officials are considered complicit. By trying to make
the villagers surrender the accounts, the township officials are shielding cor-
rupt cadres by allowing them to destroy the evidence of their crimes. The
villagers also criticize the Panyu Civil Affairs Bureau’s refusal of their recall mo-
tion as “a serious violation” of the law. “Since ancient times, officials just
protected each other” when any of them had violated the rules, the Declaration
says, “so what recourse do we villagers have?”
The Declaration also focuses on the brutality of police actions against villag-
ers, particularly highlighting the injuries of a 16-year-old boy and an 80-year-old
woman. The peaceful behavior of villagers is contrasted with this. It character-
izes arrests of activists as an effort to stop the recall campaign. According to this
view, state power is being exercised in ways that merely serve to protect the in-
terests of officials.
The tone of the Declaration is impatient, even desperate. Guo advised the
villagers to challenge the Panyu Civil Affairs Bureau decision through adminis-
trative reconsideration or litigation.72 The Declaration explains: “We asked how
long this would take, and they said, several months. This made us feel in de-
spair, how can we wait that long?” They could not continue to blockade the
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office for several months, as this would disrupt village businesses. The Declara-
tion concludes: “We want democracy! We want justice! We want rule of law! We
are the masters of the country; we have the right to determine our own fate!”
The Open Letter positions the recallers as the legitimate representatives of
the villagers, stating that “the elders and fellow villagers have reacted strongly,
consistently arguing that Villager Committee Chief Chen Jinsheng should as-
sume major responsibility for these problems.” In terms of their approach to
leadership, the villagers focus on strength in unity. The Speech urges the villag-
ers to adopt a rights-based identity, calling on them to “take back” their rights,
and states that “if everyone unites as one heart, to struggle for our legitimate
rights and interests in accordance with law, we will definitely achieve victory.”
The combination of having the law on one’s side and self-reliance was thought
to guarantee success. This egalitarian vision reflects an inclusive and demo-
cratic ethos.
For the villagers, social justice is integral to the campaign; it is not just a ques-
tion of halting corruption, but also of remedying the gross inequalities that
resulted from the redistribution of village resources. The implicit message is
that villager self-governance should mean a fair share for all, and they see soli-
darity as a key value of such governance. They envisage the public space of
deliberation over village affairs as one in which all can assert claims on village re-
sources, thus intimately linking political rights with economic rights.
But the villagers clearly believe they need outside help to change the power
structure in the village. They repeatedly highlight the importance of outside
supporters, initially in the Speech, which begins thus: “Elders and fellow villag-
ers, greetings! Today everyone has come together here for law popularization
propaganda lectures, to which, we hear, news media reporters, experts, and
scholars have also come over from Guangzhou, to observe this meeting. To start
with, on behalf of us all, I would like to offer them our sincere thanks for coming
over!”73 The Declaration concludes with an appeal to outsiders: “Brothers and
sisters of the world please extend your hand in support to assist us in realizing
our rights. We are truly grateful to you!”74 Cutting off outside support and en-
gagement was central to the strategy the local authorities adopted to suppress
the protest movement.
Village Women
For the most part those who spoke and wrote about what happened in Taishi
were men, but middle-aged and elderly women were also at the forefront of the
protests, according to the available images and some accounts of the events.
Through their actions, the women opened up a public space, but what they said
went largely unrecorded and thus did not travel beyond the immediate space in
which their speech occurred.
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Ai Xiaoming’s reporting explains the prominence of women in the protests
by detailing the gendered nature of the poverty in Taishi Village.75 She describes
how many of the village men have left the village to find work; a number of
women who married into Taishi village have to work as farm laborers for low
wages (as they have no land to farm); while some of the elderly women have to
sort and haul garbage for a living. Although there are more than one hundred
factories on what used to be village land, some people can hardly afford to pay
the necessary fees to send their children to school.76
Ai’s accounts seek to give voice to the women who played such central roles
in the recall campaign. A “grandma” who was detained describes her interaction
with the police. She insists that no one pressured her to attend the 31 August
hunger strike protest, and she uses the opportunity of conversing with officials
to point out her economic difficulties, the plight of her sick husband who has
not had proper treatment, the poor food she has to eat, and her lack of income
since she has no land to farm.
I told them that things are very difficult for us; we had hoped to get some
benefit for our household along with the [village]. Why is there no money
to share out although our land has been taken? They asked how much we
get per year, and I said that each person’s share is around 600 to 700
[yuan]. How can we eat with such a small amount of money? If we had
land, even a little, if we got just one or two mu back, we could grow some-
thing to sell for our livelihood. They said, what about your children then? I
said sometimes our children give us some money, but they don’t have
much. So sometimes we have around 100 [yuan] for medical care, but you
know that if you are sick and you don’t have money these days they won’t
even let you into the hospital. They nodded.77
Lü Banglie also highlights the role of women in the protests, describing how
they came forward on the second and third days of the hunger strike despite the
arrests on the first day. On both those days, all protesters were female.78 On the
second day, he describes them as engaging in a “battle of wits” with township of-
ficials. When officials questioning them after their arrest pushed them to finger
the “masterminds” of the protest, they all insisted that the organizers were the
officials themselves.79 Through this verbal twist, the women expressed their an-
ger about how, by insisting that the protests were being orchestrated, the official
version of events maligned them and robbed them of agency.
A villager named Chen Ruimei said that when four township officials
asked her if she was the mastermind behind this hunger strike protest, she
responded: “You are the masterminds, you made us go on hunger strike.”
The officials asked again, “Isn’t there a big boss supporting you? When you
guard the Villager Committee office, don’t you get paid thirty yuan per
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day? And sixty yuan for the night
shift?” Chen answered, “It’s Village
Chief Chen Jinsheng who is sup-
porting it, and we just get however
much he gives us.” Spurred to an-
ger, the officials said, “Don’t say
that again, or we’ll sue you!” Chen
boldly said, “Go right ahead and
sue me!”80
The women’s persistence led to a
compromise: on the third day of the
hunger strike, 2 September, the
Panyu Civil Affairs Bureau told the
protesting villagers that if they sub-
mitted original signatures for the
recall motion, it would be reconsid-
ered. Through this passage point, the
dispute gained procedural legiti-
macy, but it was a procedure tightly
controlled by the authorities. On 5
September, villagers handed in a new
version of the motion with some 800
signatures. An official told villagers
that on 7 September, officials of the Bureau would come to the village to verify
the identities of the signers, and the following day, a notice was put up in the vil-
lage to that effect.
The checking of signatories was a contentious event, as the identity docu-
ments of some forty villagers were rejected by the work team from the Bureau.
Again, women were at the forefront of the effort, with several very old women,
including one of over 100 years old, turning out.81 Over the course of two days, 7
and 8 September, 584 signatories were confirmed, thus constituting well over a
third of the electors in the village. The following day, the Yuwotou Township
government issued a public announcement stating that the recall motion had
been carried, posting a notice stating this in Taishi Village on 11 September.82
It was largely women who stood guard outside the Villager Committee office
between 3 August and 12 September, when forces of the Yuwotou Township
government moved into the village to end the blockade. Shattering the villag-
ers’ optimism, the authorities employed sixty-three vehicles and close to a
thousand police officers and security personnel, including riot police in full
gear. High-pressure water hoses were used against the elderly women guarding
the office, knocking a number of them down. Officials removed the account
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Village women argue with township officials
who are checking signatures on the recall
motion on 7 September 2005. Well over one
third of Taishi villagers supported the recall
motion. (Credit: Huang Haitao)
books from the Villager Committee office. As part of this sweep, forty-eight peo-
ple were detained, a large proportion of them women.
Even after this show of force, some villagers persisted, voting a full slate of in-
dependent villagers on to the Recall Committee on 16 September. At the same
time, however, the local authorities were working hard to abort the recall cam-
paign. A number of the most active women were held in detention and
threatened with prison terms, while their families were pressured. By 23 Sep-
tember, all the independent Recall Committee members had withdrawn, citing
poor health, and been replaced by officially backed candidates. Officials went
house to house asking people who had signed the recall motion to retract. By 29
September, the authorities were able to announce that with only 188 signato-
ries remaining, the recall motion was invalid. A climate of fear was palpable in
the village, with young men in army fatigues patrolling the streets and attacking
outsiders who tried to go in to find out what was happening, including lawyers
for the detained villagers.83
The Cause Lawyer
In his account of the Taishi events, Guo sets some distance between himself and
the action: as a “cause lawyer” he sees this as a “case” that forms part of his larger
project. The focus of his accounts is on the way the Taishi events exemplify the
aims of the “rights defense movement” in claiming legal rights and activating
constitutional rights, thus contributing to building the rule of law and also to
democratization. They thus have a wider significance as models for action else-
where.84 Here, then, the particular needs of the Taishi villagers disappear into a
wider project, in which the displacement of the objectives of ordinary people is
not considered problematic.
In describing his relationship with the villagers, Guo presents a hierarchically
ordered picture. His role in the Taishi protests was to provide guidance and ex-
pert advice. When villager representatives including Feng Qiusheng met him
and Lü Banglie, they “sought teachings” (qing jiao) from them. Guo and Lü sug-
gested the recall strategy to these Taishi villagers, and they “happily” agreed. Lü
spent a significant time in the village to give villagers “legal guidance.”85
Part of this guidance involved direction on strategy. The nonviolence of the
Taishi protests was, Guo says, “based on” talks he “and others” gave on the sub-
ject. But the pupils did not always listen: Guo says that rights defense activists
“felt very awkward” about the villagers’ takeover of the Villager Committee of-
fice, even though no violence was apparently involved, either to property or to
persons. As an assertion of rights prior to any adjudication through expert-led
processes, this action evidently violated Guo’s sense of rule of law. Neverthe-
less, Guo asserts that the nonviolent approach of the villagers, despite police
brutality, was “a model” for the nation.86
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Guo’s writings paradoxically combine images of military conquest with com-
mitments to gradualism and nonviolence. He writes:
The events of the past year have proved that the rights defense forces in
mainland China are just embarking on a path of simulated retribution and
rising grievances, the doctrine of liberalism originating in the West has al-
ready been married with China’s homegrown tradition of heroes in
Confucian and Mencian doctrines, and this generation of believers in de-
mocracy will emulate the experience of the Christians in conquering the
Roman Empire to conquer the Chinese Empire of Dictatorship. Our objec-
tive is very clear: we will promote “political reform under the rule of law”
as exemplified in the “Taishi model,” thus gradually and in an orderly man-
ner realizing constitutional democracy. Our methods are also very clear:
pushing forward a citizenship rights movement through “nonviolence, no
enemies, no bloodshed.”87
Leadership is a crucial factor in determining the outcome of events, in Guo’s
view. In a note preceding his dissemination of the villagers’ Hunger Strike Dec-
laration, Guo highlights the fact that leaders of the Taishi recall campaign Feng
Qiusheng and Liang Shusheng were themselves participating, despite the fact
that they faced arrest.88 In terms of his own participation, Guo writes that he
stepped “out from behind the scenes” to take responsibility for Taishi events in
order to prevent villagers from being sent to jail. Detained on 13 September fol-
lowing the storming of Taishi Village on the day before, Guo was held until 27
December, when he was released without charge.89
He asserts: “What we should be proud of is that the greatest sacrifices were
made by rights defense activists. They did not hide in the back, but came for-
ward with an ethic of responsibility.” Guo reportedly refused food and water
from 13 September to 10 November, with two objectives: first, to express his
“firm opposition” to the “rampancy of the ugly phenomenon of the arbitrary de-
tention of innocents by wicked power holders”; and second, he thought that
the longer he maintained the hunger strike, the more attention would be given
to the cases of detained villagers. For people who have thrown themselves into
the struggle for democracy and freedom, he writes, “detention and conviction
on criminal charges is nothing, it is a kind of glory.” Others would be inspired by
“heroes like us” to join the cause.90
The Virtual Rights Defense Movement
The protests in Taishi Village quickly attracted national and international atten-
tion. A handful of domestic media reports quickly led to a large amount of
discussion in virtual public spaces on the internet. Even after domestic report-
ing was blocked by official censors, such discussion continued to be fuelled by
regular reporting on developments in the case in transnational Chinese-lan-
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guage media circulated within China via the internet. Such reports often relied
on information from the outsiders involved in the case, particularly Guo
Feixiong.
Thus the internet’s function in creating “alternative” open spaces for com-
munication and debate among “online publics” was a feature of this case. It also
demonstrated how these publics can be connected by cross-posting that spread
the news about the Taishi protests from one forum to another.91 In some senses,
the protests themselves also spilled into this public sphere, in that the internet
postings were not mere “discussions” but also actions to support the protests,
including open letters and appeals for the release of detained people, particu-
larly Guo Feixiong.92 However, the voices of the villagers themselves are notable
by their absence from this public sphere, except insofar as they are quoted by
journalists in their articles. Thus this might be termed an oppositional public
sphere, but hardly one that provided space for the formation of a subaltern
counter-public.
In terms of the wider discussion in the activist community, based on a scan of
titles of postings and reading of selected items, many of the posts reflect similar
approaches to those of Guo, outlined above. They give great importance to the
Taishi events, presenting them as a breakthrough in terms of local implementa-
tion of rule of law and democratic rights.93
There is much emphasis on the role of the rights defense activists, particu-
larly Guo, in initiating and leading the Taishi protests. Following Guo’s
detention, the internet discussions focus largely on him, although many villag-
ers were held during the same period. Guo is referred to as a “hero” and a
“gentleman” (junzi), a term of respect. There were a number of open letters and
petition drives calling for Guo’s release, which often did not even mention the
detained villagers by name (although many of their names were known).94
In these discussions, as in Guo’s account, the Taishi events are not situated in
the context of the growing nationwide phenomenon of rural “rightful resis-
tance” documented by O’Brien and Li, which has been written on extensively in
China. The local campaigns they describe relied on knowledge and strategy
generated by rural people themselves.95 While the Taishi villagers allude to suc-
cessful recall campaigns96 and Lü Banglie was himself involved in such an
action, Guo and the internet commentators largely present the Taishi protests
as a new and surprising phenomenon.
In this virtual oppositional public sphere, villagers appear as images, as
massed protesters. This is a public space in which they are objects of observa-
tion, but not speaking subjects. The dispute has been almost entirely translated
into one about law and democracy, rather than social justice. The effect of the
combined mediation of technology and experts silenced the voices of the vil-
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lage women as well as the synthesis attempted by the village recall campaigners.
Here it is the lawyers who are the heroes, the motive force of change. It is not
clear whether any Taishi villagers accessed the internet in relation to their pro-
tests, but the vast majority of the texts that made up the discussions in the
alternative public sphere were not of their making.
Conclusion
The translation of the Taishi contention into the form of a legal dispute had a
paradoxical effect: it became a struggle for democratic rights in which the hold-
ers of those rights were largely rendered incapable of representing themselves
—except in casting ballots—and others who spoke for them were transformed
into the de facto leaders of the action.
While the village recall campaigners sought to “vernacularize”97 the legal pro-
visions on village governance by emphasizing their linkage to visions of moral
community harking back to a more collectivist past, this synthesis did not travel
extensively, except in the villagers’ texts. For Guo and the rights defense activ-
ists, Taishi was about the rule of law and democracy. As a reflection of this
translation, the women in the Taishi protests were deprived of voice in the pub-
lic space beyond the village created around the contention, since they
continued to speak in a different language. The dominant language of the dis-
pute drowned out the original grievances in Taishi. Except in the reporting of Ai
Xiaoming and Lü Banglie, the village women thus became a mere backdrop to
the dramatics of mostly male “heroes.” The connection between the gendered
nature of rural poverty highlighted in the Taishi case and the prominence of
women in the protests went largely unremarked.
The Taishi case is emblematic of how law has become a primary field of con-
tention in China, with both villagers and officials deploying law as justification
for their claims and positions. Mobilizing the law is certainly a way of creating
safe space for protest in the face of an authoritarian state.98 But those asserting
claims still have choices; they shape the political opportunity structure, rather
than merely reacting to it.99 China’s designation as “socialist” means that claims
for social justice potentially have just as much political resonance as those for le-
gal rights; comparing the present unfavorably with the past is a major theme in
expressions of resistance in China.100 The Chinese government’s rhetoric on giv-
ing priority to “the right to subsistence” and its ratification of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2001 also present oppor-
tunities for framing livelihood issues in terms of “rights.”
For the “rights defense movement,” the choice of the legal rights frame re-
flects a consensus among this loose-knit liberal opposition that solutions to
many, if not most, of the nation’s problems can be found in rule of law and
constitutionalism. Even though differences of approach are evident within this
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movement,101 in its preference for elite-led, “orderly” reform, which largely es-
chews mass action, this view thus converges with official approaches to popular
contention that channel grievances into claims for narrowly defined legal rights
based on existing law. This is partly inherent in the idea of a rights “case,” in
which a solution to a specific problem is sought through legal institutions and
procedure.102 Such a view of rights tends to be conservative in that it stabilizes
the existing order, requires the intervention of experts, and often moves the dis-
pute out of spheres where the people concerned have a voice. Rights, then, are
inherently ambivalent: whether they are a conservative or radical force depends
on the particular context of their deployment.103
Of course, as Meyer notes, in polities that are repressive, “virtually everyone
with a grievance has interest in cooperating in opposition.”104 Certainly, the vil-
lage women were ready to mobilize. From the evidence available, they felt that
the moral superiority of their claims and the involvement of outsiders would
bring results, and they had little to lose.105 The village recall campaigners used
the law to create a public space for discussion of these grievances and attempted
a synthesis between legal texts and a moral vision of a fair share for all. However,
such mobilization was unsustainable in the face of official repression, although
the question of whether it had any long-term effects on those at the forefront of
the protests remains open.
What can be said is that the recall campaign strategy meant that the legal ex-
perts were ineluctably translated into being the leaders of the campaign as it
unfolded beyond the village itself, confirming Callon’s assertion, “To translate is
to displace.”106 The public spaces opened up by this approach were not condu-
cive to the formation of subaltern counter-publics,107 since they were oriented
toward legal argumentation and expertise and were also temporary in nature,
lasting only for the procedural duration of the campaign. The alternative public
sphere of the internet was apparently inaccessible to the villagers. Unlike more
radical spaces for counter-publics elsewhere,108 these public spheres did not
provide opportunities to turn needs into public matters and thus make connec-
tions between political and economic rights. The grievances of Taishi thus
entered the national public sphere for a brief moment to demonstrate the legiti-
macy of channeling the contentious politics of local claims through the orderly
process of the law.
As well as bridging divides between collective actions, creating a counter-
hegemonic movement based on rights depends on transforming the identities
of participants into rights-bearing subjects, a process that is not easy, even in
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more rights-oriented cultural environments. As Merry writes, “Poor women
think of themselves as having rights only when powerful institutions treat them
as if they do.”109 Evidently, the failure of the Taishi recall campaign made unlikely
such a transformation of the villagers’ sense of identity, and particularly the de-
velopment of a collective sense of belonging to a rights defense movement. Yet
this was not merely an effect of repression: the translations made in the course
of the contention also failed to build on the evident enthusiasm of the villagers,
and the synthesis the village recall campaigners tried to achieve was largely ig-
nored in the oppositional public sphere.
While the “vanguardist tendencies” of outsiders who come in and “supplant”
the objectives of a grassroots movement with their own would likely be chal-
lenged in India,110 in opposition circles in China no such critique is in evidence.
For a movement focused on supporting claims for rights, the question of what
forms of leadership promote these underlying values are of particular impor-
tance. Although experience elsewhere indicates that democratic and inclusive
forms of organizing may result in more effective movement strategy, leadership
in social movements has often been “bureaucratic” and “exclusivist.” The for-
mer, characterized by hierarchy and command, is oriented toward
accommodation with existing elites and diminishes the transformative poten-
tial of movements; while the latter concentrates leadership into “core groups”
that are separated from a more passive mass of followers, leading by means of
“heroic example.”111 Such tendencies were apparent in the Taishi contention.
Overall, then, the Taishi affair highlights potential difficulties in creating link-
ages between instances of protest on the ground through the use of “legal
rights” cases, both in terms of connecting grievances to strategies and in con-
tributing to broader and more sustained mobilization through the formation of
subaltern counter-publics. As used by Guo and the rights defense activists, the
rights “master frame”112 failed to incorporate social justice issues or to connect
resources emerging from rural struggles to their wider project. Similar dis-
tances between local organizing and the framing and approaches of potential
elite allies are also evident in labor-related contention.113 An example is the dis-
tance between the Maoist rhetoric frequently deployed by urban worker
activists114 and the liberal approach of many transnational campaign groups.
The examination of this case shows how the concept of translation—both as
a form of transformation and as embodied in particular mediating elements or
persons who translate—can be used beyond the transnational sphere, with par-
ticular applicability to contentious politics involving law and rights. This
methodological approach foregrounds the power effects of specific choices of
strategy and language as well as the way the material conditions of the action
contribute to the outcome. It concentrates on transformations that occur
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through the flows of meaning, engagement of different technologies, and
changes of venue, and links various stages and arenas of the cycle of contention.
Writings on social movements often advocate a “process-oriented” ap-
proach,115 but what this entails is rarely specified. A sociology of translation pro-
vides pointers for following process and analyzing transformations that occur
along the way.116 Such an approach, for example, addresses the insufficient at-
tention in the framing literature to the consequences of framing for other
movement processes and outcomes,117 while also proposing a methodology for
studying these interactions. In this article, by concentrating particularly on key
passage points that open into public spheres and the role of human and nonhu-
man translators and mediators (including technologies, lawyers, and the law
itself) in these transitions, I have used this approach to illuminate how certain
movement outcomes occurred in a particular case and to illustrate the power ef-
fects of choices made by the actors involved.
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